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Abstract: This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 
venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany’s Neuer Markt 
between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ 
with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics.  
Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the 
complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying 
the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture 
capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the 
initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. T his study provides 
evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-
backed IPOs. 
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1.  Introduction 
Venture capitalists are described as experts in the field of high-risk company funding (see for 
example FENN/LIANG/PROWSE (1997), SAHLMAN (1990) and LERNER (1995)). They not only 
specialize by concentrating on certain industry sectors and specific stages of a company’s 
development, but also actively engage in monitoring and consulting activities. Since they 
often serve as members on the “Aufsichtsrat”
1 and frequently invest their capital based on 
whether intermediate goals have been reached, they are able to influence the behavior and 
corporate strategy of the company under consideration. Their incentive to improve corporate 
governance is on the one hand due to the finite life of the partnership and - since their 
compensation is linked to the firm’s performance - to the maximization of the exit price.
2 On 
the other hand, being repeat players who regularly have to raise new funds, venture capitalists 
face reputational risk. One would therefore expect that, much like prestigious underwriters or 
auditors, venture capitalists certify the quality of a company when going public.  
 
Within the extensive underpricing literature some empirical studies examine whether the 
market honors the presumed monitoring-activities of venture capitalists. Since this control 
benefit may reduce the ex-ante uncertainty for future investors, it should lead to lower 
underpricing. Underpricing is defined as the spread between the initial offering price and the 
opening price on the first day of trading. However, empirical evidence is mixed. Among 
others,  BARRY/MUSCARELLA/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS (1990) and  MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991) 
confirm the certification role of venture capitalists for the US market. They find evidence for 
venture capital (VC)-backed IPOs suffering less underpricing than non VC-backed IPOs. On 
the other hand, FRANCIS/HASAN (2001) and SMART/ZUTTER (2000), who also analyze US 
data, find initial returns of venture-backed IPOs on average to be higher than those of non 
venture-backed IPOs.  
LJUNGQVIST (1999) using the data set of MEGGINSON/ WEISS (1991), demonstrates that the 
finding of venture-backed IPOs appearing less underpriced has to be attributed to the 
incentives of the old shareholders to reduce underpricing and not to the circumstance of 
venture-backing. Old shareholders will care for the pricing of an issue or for the choice of an 
                                                 
1  The „Aufsichtsrat“ is similar to the supervisory board. However, German stock companies are governed by 
two boards. The supervisory board on the one hand is elected by and represents shareholders. Moreover, it 
appoints the company’s executive board. The executive board on the other hand comprises firm managers and 
oversees day-to-day operations.  
2  When selling at the time of the initial public offering (IPO), this price is equivalent to the offer price.   2
underwriter to the extent that such decisions affect their wealth. LJUNGQVIST illustrates, that 
underpricing-induced wealth losses increase with the number of shares sold in the IPO. As a 
consequence companies selling a lot of old shares should show little underpricing, due to the 
incentives of the old shareholders to reduce underpricing.  
 
This study contributes to the underpricing discussion. It analyzes the certification role of 
venture capitalists and underwriting banks
3 at the IPO exploring a unique German data set of 
companies going public at Neuer Markt. Moreover it considers the argumentation offered by 
LJUNGQVIST (1999) and examines the incentives of the old shareholders to take influence on 
underpricing using similar variables and applying ordinary least square regression 
calculations. The analysis of the German market is of particular interest since it sheds more 
light on the importance of venture capital in a bank-based financial system. In Germany VC 
financing has only recently taken off as an important part of the financial services industry. 
As a consequence only little empirical work is available to date. Few information exist for 
instance about the players on the German VC market, their investments and divestment 
activities. Thus, this paper has two objectives, first, to enlarge the level of knowledge with 
respect to venture capital financing in Germany  focusing on underpricing  and second to 
compare the results found with those of international studies. 
 
The main  result of this study  with respect to underpricing  is, that venture-backed IPOs at 
Neuer Markt experience considerably more underpricing than non-venture backed IPOs. This 
phenomenon can not be explained following arguments in the literature.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the history of venture capital in 
Germany and its driving factors. Section III outlines the impact of the introduction of the 
Neuer Markt at Frankfurt Stock Exchange on the primary equity market in Germany. 
Moreover, it provides an analysis of the IPO-costs for Neuer Markt issues. In section IV – 
based on the theoretical literature on underpricing and certification mechanisms – the testable 
hypotheses are formulated. Section V describes the data set and the design of the empirical 
analysis. In sections VI and VII descriptive statistics and the empirical results are presented. 
The paper concludes with a summary and an outlook in section VIII. 
 
                                                 
3  Due to the narrow underwriting market until 1998, only two empirical studies exist analyzing the certification  
 role of underwriters in Germany (see WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994) and KASERER/KEMPF (1995)).   3
2.  Venture Capital Financing in Germany 
The definition of “venture capital” differs in the literature
4. In the Anglo-American 
understanding “venture capital” is often used in the context of early-stage (such as seed and 
start-up financing) and expansion financing.  In Germany, “venture capital” is more 
comprehensive, since it also includes later-stage capital (such as bridge-, buy out-, and 
turnaround-financing).
5 While the former types of investments are crucial for the development 
and implementation of business ideas by young growth companies, the latter types of 
investments are important for capital structure reasons of more mature, small to medium-sized 
companies. To be aware of venture capital’s different meanings is important when 
interpreting (German) figures and in particular when comparing empirical results of various 
international studies.  
 
VC financing in Germany has been insignificant and underdeveloped until recently.
6 The 
literature analyzing the manifold reasons, discusses in particular the social environment (e.g., 
status of entrepreneurs, the relationship of academia and trade and industry), legal and tax 
regulations and the exit conditions for venture capitalists (see e.g.  LEOPOLD/FROMMANN 
(1998), BECKER/HELLMANN (2000) and BETSCH/GROH/SCHMIDT (2000)). 
Searching for the roots of the current German venture capital industry one has to go back to 
the year 1965, when the first “Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften” (KBGs) were founded, most 
of them by banks.
7 The success of KBGs was modest, the number of investments, primarily in 
established medium-sized companies was small.
8  
With the launch of the European Recovery Program (ERP-Program) initiated by the German 
government in 1971 the investment focus was extended to small- to medium sized companies 
and setting-up of businesses. The program’s goal was (and still is) to refinance such 
investments at a preferential interest rate and to insure venture capitalist against potential 
                                                 
4  For a deeper discussion see e.g. BYGRAVE/TIMMONS (1992), STEDLER (1986), BETSCH/GROH/SCHMIDT (2000) 
and BALZER (2000). 
5 This broader expression is comparable to the American understanding of private equity. 
6 The historical overview presented here follows the description of LESSAT ET AL. (1999). 
7 To compare, in England going back to the initiative of the Bank of England and with the cooperation of major 
banks the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation Ltd. (ICFC), today known as 3i was established in 
1945. On the other hand in the United States the first professional venture capital company named “American 
Research and Development Corporation” (ARD) was founded in 1949.  
8 According to LEOPOLD/FROMMANN (1998) 33 KBGs have been founded between 1965 and 1972. Even though 
20 of these do still exist, only 2 have some importance within the VC-industry today.   4
losses.
9 Since the existing KBGs made only little use of this form of refinancing, the German 
states started to support the establishment of so-called “Mittelständische Beteiligungs-
gesellschaften” (MBGs). Primarily MBGs had the task to improve the equity base of local 
companies by investing the financial means offered by the governmental ERP-program. Even 
though publicly subsidized equity for investment purposes became relatively more important, 
the major part (amounting to 70% of the total volume) was still provided by banks. Overall, 
the venture capital market experienced only little development. The level of the invested 
volume was rather low, amounting to approximately € 0,29 billion by the end of 1979.  
Finally, in 1983 the German VC industry started to expand.
  German equity investment 
companies, copying the sucessful setup of American venture capitalists were founded. MBGs, 
which had to experience little deal flow during the seventies, became reactivated. Banks and 
industrial companies expanded their involvement, e.g., by founding affiliated VC companies. 
  
With the beginning of the nineties, the time of the German reunification, the importance of 
early-stage financing became more of an issue. The number of newly established businesses
10 
increased. Venture capitalists started to specialize. Moreover the government extended its 
program, m aking financial support available especially to start-up and early-stage 
investments
11. VC became a truly attractive proposition for investors in the German economy. 
Until 1996, a continuous, almost linear growth of the VC industry could be observed, 
followed by a period of exponential growth.
 12, 
13 
This recent development can mainly be attributed to the increasing liquidity of investors, the 
foundation of new VC companies, the rising public interest and in addition, following 
HEILMANN (2000), to the considerable number of foreign venture capitalists entering the 
German market.  
 
                                                 
9  Such programs are carried out by the “Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau” and the “Deutsche Ausgleichsbank”.  
 The internet page of the FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY offers further information:  
 http://www.bmwi.de/ 
10 In the appendix figure A.1 presents estimations of the INSTITUT FÜR MITTELSTANDSFORSCHUNG (IFM) about 
business foundations since 1975 in Germany. 
11 To be mentioned are programs of the “Deutsche Ausgleichsbank” and the “Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau”, 
such as the „Beteiligungskapital für junge Technologieunternehmen“ (BJTU) or the „Beteiligungsprogramm 
für kleine Technologieunternehmen“ (BTU), respectively. 
12 See Figure 1 on page 5. Figures containing data of the members of the BVK account to (according to BVK) 
90% of the volume of the German VC market.  
13 For the development of gross investments of members of the BVK (in € Mio.) and the number of beneficiary 
companies see figure A.2. in the appendix.   5
Figure 1: Total Portfolio Held by Members of the Bundesverband Deutscher 
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften e.V. (BVK) (in € Billion) 
10.7
7.1
5.1
3.7
3.1 2.9 2.7 2.6
2.3 2.0
1.6
1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
 
The increase would h ave been impossible without a fundamental change in Germany’s 
funding and investment environment. Accompanied by regulatory changes
14 and an upswing 
in the German equity culture
15, the launch of the Neuer Markt in March 1997, offering a 
further exit mechanism for venture capitalists, has to be seen as most stimulating for the 
German venture capital industry.
16 Compared to other strategies, exiting a VC investment by 
the means of an IPO is attractive as it usually results in the highest valuation of a company.
17 
Furthermore, the potential exit through an IPO permits the entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
to enter into an implicit contract concerning the future corporate control.
18  
                                                 
14 Amendment of the “Gesetz für Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften“ (UBGG) within the changes of the 
3rd „Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz“. 
15 According to the magazine DIE BANK (2000), Germany is more and more establishing an equity culture. 
Evidence is given by an annual opinion survey: Of the persons asked, the percentage of investors in stocks 
(equity funds) has risen from 13% (9%) in 1996 to 22% (28%) in 1999. Moreover the DAI-FACTBOOK (2000) 
of the “Deutsches Aktieninstitut” (DAI) shows that stocks constitute about 13% (8%) of the financial assets of 
private households in 2000 (1996). 
16 According to BECKER/HELLMANN (2000), the launch of the “Geregelter Markt” in 1987 had almost no effect 
on the venture capital industry. 
17 See for example SMITH/SMITH (2000). For an empirical analysis on the efficient pattern on exit vehicles see 
CUMMING/MACINTOSH (2001) 
18 For a detailed discussion see e.g. JENG/WELLS (1998) and BLACK/G ILSON (1998).   6
Table 1 describes volume and percentage of various exit vehicles. The table shows a relation 
between the introduction of the Neuer Markt and the increasing importance of IPOs for 
venture capitalists in Germany since 1998. 
Table 1: Volume and Percentage of Exit Vehicle as stated by BVK 
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
    € mio.  %   € mio.  %   € mio.  %   € mio.  %   € mio.  % 
IPO     29.65     9.76     24.26    8.95       19.80      3.84      75.68    19.68     148.31    19.09 
Buy back     78.07   25.70   153.83  56.76     166.65    32.32     163.17    42.43     159.89    20.58 
Trade sale   126.10  41.51     82.66  30.50     276.43    53.61     123.56    32.13     197.03    25.36 
Other
19     69.96  23.03     10.27    3.79       52.75    10.23       22.15      5.76    271.69    34.97 
Total   303.79  100.00   271.01  100.00     515.63  100.00     384.56  100.00   776.92   100.00 
Therefore, a closer examination of this market segment seems worthwhile, as it covers on 
average about 53% of public offerings backed by venture capital since 1998.
20  
 
 
3.  Germany’s Neuer Markt and the Costs of Raising Capital  
The Neuer Markt is Germany’s trading segment for innovative growth companies. It was 
launched in March 1997 as a subsidiary of the Deutsche Börse AG, with the objective to 
attract small- to medium-sized, young technology firms. As figure 2 indicates, the number of 
companies that h ave gone public in Germany or rather on the New Market has increased 
dramatically, since 1997. From March 1997 through March 2000, over 200 companies went 
public on the Neuer Markt, while at the same time new listings at the first and second segment 
stayed close to their previous levels. In total about 320 new listings were recorded for that 
period.
21 
                                                 
19 The classification “Other” in 1999 contains, among other things, selling to a financial investor or divestment 
through write-off (see BVK yearbook 2000).  
20 The remaining 47% can be split into IPOs on other German stock markets (20%) and listings on foreign stock 
exchanges (27%) such as the NASDAQ. 
 Beyond that there is evidence for the international acceptance of this market as it is more and more chosen as 
exit mechanism by foreign venture capital funds (7 Ö/3 CH/3 USA-C/2 Isr/2 UK during the period March 
1997 to March 2000). 
21 According to JOHNSON (2000), from 1949 through 1996 a total of only 356 companies went public in 
Germany.   7
Figure 2: New Issues in Germany
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In order to provide investors with information about the quality of these IPO candidates, the 
Neuer Markt set up much stricter listing and disclosure requirements than the established 
exchanges. JOHNSON (2000) describes and compares the standards in Germany (all markets of 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) and the United States (NYSE, NASDAQ) in detail.
23 He states 
that more rigid rules of disclosure on the Neuer Markt have an effect both on the number and 
on the nature of companies that go public.
24  
 
What is remarkable about the “how to go public” at the Neuer Markt is that from March 1997 
to March 2000 all but one company (TRIUS AG)
25 chose book-building to price the shares.
26 
                                                 
22 On the SMAX (Small Cap Exchange) - introduced in April 1999 - second market stocks are traded. The listing 
requirements of the SMAX follow - apart from small modifications - those of the Neuer Markt. 
23 For an assessment, whether the high listing and information demands of the Neuer Markt lead to the desired 
increased transparency and improved liquidity, thus providing confidence to investors, see e.g. LEUZ (2000), 
GERKE/BOSCH (2000) and THEISSEN (1998).  
24 He underpins his view by the significant increase in IPOs and the high number of small, young companies that 
went public at Neuer Markt. However, more rigid disclosure rules might be one reason for the increase of 
IPOs, but other explanations are manifold. Just to mention some: The IT-revolution, the high number of 
newly founded companies since the German reunification, the simultaneous decline of margins at the bank 
lending business and the growing popularity of investment banking. 
25 Trius AG went public by using a tender procedure, selling the stocks via an auction. 
26 Until 1995 it was common to use the fixed-price method in Germany. One of the main imperfections of this 
method in comparison to book-building is, that underwriting banks have a vital interest to set up a low offer 
price: Since they do not receive any information concerning demand (e.g. through bids by institutional and 
retail investors) before the price fixing, they have more to care for the placement risk.   8
Although during the observation period two out of three issues were oversubscribed
27, the 
final issue price was always fixed within the book-building range
28 and never above; merely 
twice
29 it remained under the minimum price limit. Following  LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON 
(2000), the reluctance to price outside the range is distinct in Germany compared to 
international practice. The m ajor potential benefit of book-building, to raise the price, if 
demand is unexpectedly high, seems hardly be exhausted.
30 This is worth mentioning as the 
pricing has influence on the costs of going public. 
 
In order to analyze the issuing costs for companies at Neuer Markt in more detail, one can 
distinguish between direct and indirect costs, as listed in table 2.
31 
The direct costs contain for example auditing and consulting fees, underwriting fees, 
marketing costs, or fees raised by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for the admission to the first 
segment, for the filing of the prospectus and for services provided by Deutsche Börse AG.
32 
The numbers quoted here are calculated from information indicated in the issuing 
prospectuses of the companies under consideration. During the period of March 1997 through 
March 2000, companies going public on the Neuer Markt had to bear on average total direct 
flotation costs of 8.43% of gross proceeds. As part of these costs the average underwriting fee 
amounted to 5.14% of gross proceeds, respectively.  
The indirect costs in the form of underpricing
33 average 63.37%. In other words, the average 
issuing company could have raised about € 29 million more, if the first market price would 
have been in correspondence with the offering price. 
                                                 
27 This is in the interest of the management as an oversubscription of the offering enables the management to 
take more influence on the allotment (see among others BRENNAN/FRANKS (1997)).  
28  80,4% of the IPOs of the sample have been fixed exactly at the upper price limit. 
29 These companies have been MSH International Services AG (book-building range/issuing price:  €  18.50-
21.50 / € 15.50) and Euromed AG (€ 10.50-13.50 / € 9.00). 
30 LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON (2000) merely conject that local regulations, the costs caused by price revisions or the 
market power of domestic investors could serve as explanations for the unwillingness to raise the price.   
31 For a cross-sectional analysis of the costs of raising capital in Germany, see: KASERER/KRAFT (2000).  
32 Strictly speaking the value of the greenshoe-option has to be added to these costs. To stabilize the stock price 
following the IPO, the issuer grants the underwriter the option to sell additional shares at the issue price and 
trade them for a time period of thirty days, if necessary. According to OCHNER (2000), underwriters do almost 
constantly retain the earnings gained by selling additional shares at the issue price (or eventually a higher 
secondary market price) and purchase them back as soon as the price of the shares falls below the issue price. 
This “gift” of the issuer to the underwriter can be explained by the high number of issues, which shifts the 
bargaining power to the underwriter. 
33 Underpricing is equivalent to a positive initial return, as the first market price exceeds the offer price.   9
Table 2: Costs of Going Public at the Neuer Markt (March 1997 - March 2000) 
„Money left on the table“ is calculated by multiplying the total volume of issues with the initial return or 
rather the underpricing, which is the spread between the opening price at the first day of trading and 
the initial offering price. Dividing the direct flotation costs by the gross proceeds of an issue, one 
receives the relative direct costs. The relative underwriting fee is defined as the underwriting fee paid 
at IPO normalized by the gross proceeds of the issue.  
In € thousand 
respectively %  Mean  Median  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  Obs.
 34 
Direct flotation costs    3,447    2,683    2,525       613   14,640  191 
Underwriting fees    2,252    1,800    1,818       225   11,600  187 
Indirect costs: Money 
left on the table  28,991    9,180  47,415  -10,800  336,375  199 
Gross issue proceeds 48,767   36,500  42,836    8,278  283,650  199 
Relative direct costs    8.43%    7.86%   3.03%    4,43%   26.85%  191 
Relative underwriting 
fees    5.14%    5.13%   1.34%    0.87%    13.04%  187 
Initial return  63.37%  30.43%  82.18%  -14.50%  433.33%     199
35 
Compared to the degree of underpricing on the German IPO market earlier studies
36 report, 
the extent of underpricing at the Neuer Markt seems to be remarkably high. This might be in 
line with the finding of STEHLE/ERHARDT (1999), that small, relatively unknown companies 
have high initial returns.  
 
 
4.  Related Literature and Hypotheses 
The theoretical literature on underpricing (for an extensive overview, see  JENKINSON/ 
LJUNGQVIST (1998)) can be divided into two main categories. 
There is theoretical work, which focuses on asymmetric information within the group of 
investors, between issuer and underwriter and between issuer and investors. Secondly, there 
are institutional explanations that try to attribute the existence of underpricing to factors such 
                                                 
34 These are the observations of the sample used for the analysis in section five. The number of observation is 
varying, since some issuing prospects offered only aggregated information. 
35 13 of the 199 observations are overpriced as indicated by the negative initial return. 17 observations have an 
initial return of 0.00%. 
36 See for example  ERHARDT  (1997), L JUNGQVIST  (1997), K ASERER/KEMPF  (1995)  or  WASSERFALLEN/ 
WITTLEDER (1994). A recent study by LÖFFLER (2000) on the Neuer Markt offers comparable numbers.   10
as price support by the underwriting bank, liability regarding the statements made in the 
issuing prospectus or aspects of corporate ownership and control. 
 
This paper focuses on theories based on asymmetric information  between issuer and 
investors. Within this branch different methods are discussed in order to reduce this “market 
imperfection”. Signaling models e.g. by  ALLEN/FAULHABER  (1989), G RINBLATT/HWANG 
(1989)  or  WELCH  (1989) suggest that from the level of underpricing investors  can draw 
conclusions about the quality of the issuing companies.
37 CARTER/MANASTER  (1990)  and 
BOOTH/SMITH  (1986) however emphasize the signaling and certification-of-quality role 
fulfilled by prestigious underwriters, the like goes for auditors and venture capitalists. In the 
following I will concentrate on the latter explanatory approach.  
 
The certification mechanism works according to the subsequent principle: Given that outside 
investors believe in the information advantage of a third party (underwriter  or venture 
capitalist), this party is able to certify the quality of a company going public if it has 
reputational capital at stake, “which must be greater than the largest possible one-time wealth 
transfer or side payment which could be obtained by certifying falsely. Furthermore it must be 
costly for the issuing firm to purchase the service of the certifying agent.” 
(MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991, p. 881)) 
Underwriters and venture capitalists should be able to carry out the role of a certifying 
authority, as they often have insider information. The underwriting bank’s information results 
from the involvement in due diligence activities and a potential lending relationship
38 prior to 
the IPO. Their incentive to examine the quality of the firm in detail goes back to their liability 
extending to statements made in the issuing prospectus.
39 Since venture capitalists belong to 
the actively engaged group of owners, they have profound knowledge about the company’s 
history, quality of management, financial situation and so o n. Moreover they involve 
themselves merely out of self-interest, due to the circumstance that their compensation is 
linked to the partnership’s performance. 
                                                 
37 The authors hypothesis is, that given companies plan to carry out a seasoned equity offering, a separating 
equilibrium of high- and low-value firms exists, permitting high-value firms to costly signal their quality by 
underpricing. JENKINSON/LJUNGQVIST (1989) criticize, that the whole mechanism of the models using the 
level of underpricing as signal depends on a two-stage selling decision, which has to preclude shareholder’s 
pre-emptive rights to seasoned offerings of primary equity, in order to recoup the costs of the signal.  
38 For an extensive discussion of the characteristics of relationship lending in Germany see ELSAS (2001). 
39 It has to be mentioned that this liability can lead to a considerable litigation and thus lawsuit risk. Therefore a 
competitive approach e.g. by TINIC (1988) suggests, that intentional underpricing may serve as an insurance 
against such securities litigation. For counterarguments see ALEXANDER (1993).    11
Both parties have reputational capital at stake as their future success is closely linked to their 
current reputation. The better the reputation, the easier the attention of trading partners can be 
caught: Underwriters regularly have to attract issuers and venture capitalists frequently have 
to raise new funds.  
One can therefore conclude that the involvement of a prestigious underwriter or venture 
capitalist should certify and credibly signal the quality of the issuing company to the market. I 
thus assume that it should pay to hire a prestigious intermediary, as it leads to a higher offer 
price, which in turn implies lower underpricing.  
 
Going back to  ROCK  (1986), C ARTER/MANASTER  (1990)  and  BOOTH/SMITH (1986) the 
following hypotheses are formulated: 
1.  The higher the ex-ante uncertainty concerning the issue, the higher the expected 
underpricing. 
2.  The more prestigious the underwriter (UWrank) involved in the IPO, the lower the 
underpricing. 
3a.  The more prestigious the venture capitalist backing the company before the IPO 
(VCrank), the lower the underpricing. 
 
Because the incentive to engage in the venture-backed company and thus the informative 
value of the signal “backed by a prestigious venture capitalist” depends in particular on the 
venture capitalist’s equity holdings prior to the IPO
40, hypothesis 3a should be narrowed 
down: 
3b.  The more prestigious the venture capitalist and the bigger the venture capitalist’s equity 
holdings of the issuer prior to the going public (VCholding), the lower the underpricing. 
Following  LJUNGQVIST (1999) and  BARRY (1989) a focus on underpricing alone possibly 
misleads: Underpricing p er se is uninformative when not controlling for the former 
shareholders’ incentives to influence underpricing. They will take influence on the pricing of 
an issue if their wealth is negatively affected by the price setting. Figuratively spoken, 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists will not care for the wealth loss occurring through 
underpricing when selling a single share, but they will care the higher their participation in the 
                                                 
40 This is in line with earlier findings of BARRY/MUSCARELLA/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS (1990).   12
offering, i.e. the more shares they sell at the IPO.
41 HABIB/LJUNGQVIST (1998) extend this 
idea
42 by assuming that the wealth loss of former shareholders at the IPO is a function of a) 
underpricing, when selling old shares, b) dilution of the value of retained shares
43 and c) costs 
arising in connection with activities that reduce underpricing and wealth losses, such as 
extensive marketing efforts prior to the IPO or the hiring of IPO experts.  
But this leads to an endogenous relation between the costs and underpricing. Since only 
aggregated figures of costs are available in most of the issuing prospectuses, the driving 
factors of these costs and with that their effect on underpricing are unclear. Therefore I 
dispense with costs as an explanatory variable and estimate a reduced form. 
Finally hypothesis 4 is introduced: 
4.  The higher the participation ratio  (partratio)  of former shareholders (e.g. venture 
capitalists or managers, respectively) the lower the underpricing. 
In line with  LJUNGQVIST  (1999) the dilution factor is taken into account, as well, when 
running the regressions. However, the predicted sign of this parameter is unclear.  
Holding risk, dilution and participation constant and controlling for the quality of an 
underwriter I now should be able to analyze, whether venture capitalists are able to certify the 
quality of a company when going public. 
 
 
5.  Data Set and Design of Analysis 
In total the collected data set contains 225 IPOs. Each of these companies were listed for the 
first time during the period of March 10
th, 1997 to March 10
th, 2000 on the Neuer Markt. The 
employed sample (comprising 199 IPOs) does not contain those 22 companies that merely 
changed the market tier or had already been listed at a foreign stock exchange before going 
public at the Neuer Markt.
44 In addition, four companies, three of them from the financial 
                                                 
41 The participation ratio (partratio) is calculated dividing the number of old shares sold by the number of shares 
outstanding before flotation. 
42 In the appendix I present the underlying model by BARRY (1989) and the extension by HABIB/LJUNGQVIST 
(1998). 
43 The dilution factor ( dilution) is determined dividing the number of new shares by the number of shares 
outstanding before flotation. 
44 The following 22 companies have therefore been excluded: BB Biotech, BB Medtech AG, Bertrandt AG, 
Broad Vision Inc., COPE Inc., COR AG Insurance Technologies, Dialog Semiconductor Plc., DICOM Group, 
ebookers.com Plc., Fortec Electronik Vertriebs AG, GfN AG, integra S.A., LHS Group Inc., Lobster 
Technology Holding AG, Micronas Semiconductor Holding AG, Mühl Product & Services AG, Pankl Racing 
Systems AG, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG, Quiagen N.V., TEAM Communications Group Inc. and 
TIPTEL AG.   13
services industry, have been excluded. These companies show extremely high values for 
balance sheet data or volume of issue.
45 
Given the differences in the definition of venture capital in the US and Germany, I establish 
comparability of the empirical studies by dividing the Neuer Markt data set into three groups: 
108 non venture-backed IPOs (54.27%), 58 venture-backed IPOs (29.15%) and 33 companies 
(16.58%)
46, that merely received bridge financing by investors. As the latter investors 
typically have not invested seed, start-up and expansion capital next to bridge financing and 
therefore engage themselves at a rather late stage of the development of an company, the 
division made can be justified by the assumption that monitoring activities and thus the 
insider knowledge of these investors is of lower quality and thus of less worth with respect to 
their certification ability.
47  
In the descriptive study I therefore separately compare the venture-backed group and the sub 
sample of companies that received bridge financing to the non-venture backed group.
48 
Because of the focus on venture capitalists and their certification role, I concentrate on the 
venture and non venture-backed sub samples when testing the hypotheses.
49  
 
Detailed information was collected from the issuing prospectus for each IPO on the total 
volume of issues, the issuing procedure, the offering expenses, the number of shares 
outstanding, the age of the company, the number of employees, the ownership structure, who 
is members of the “Aufsichtsrat”, the identity of invested venture capitalists or rather private 
equity companies and underwriters, and data of the financial statements.  
Additionally, further information was obtained through the media such as the first day of 
trading, the book-building spread, the initial offering price and the closing day bid price for 
                                                 
45 These companies are ConSors Discount Broker, Direkt Anlage Bank AG, Entrium Direct Bankers AG and 
Carrier 1 International S.A.. 
46 The sum of companies in the VC- and bridge financed group is lower than the number of venture-backed IPOs 
indicated by Deutsche Börse AG. The reason for this is that some of the backed IPOs have received equity as 
indicated by Deutsche Börse AG, which can neither be called venture capital nor private equity (including 
bridge financing). Instead, the capital theses companies received was offered by investment companies, e.g. 
by DEKA mbH., Rothschild Asset Management Ltd. or Invesco, without a selling intent. These IPOs have not 
been considered as backed IPOs. 
47 In order to find support for this assumption the monitoring skills of venture capitalists in comparison to those 
of bridge financiers are examined in more detail using proxies such as: the fraction of the issuing firm’s shares 
owned by the venture capitalist/bridge financier or the length of time that a venture capitalist/bridge financier 
has served on the supervisory board, see table 4.  
48 For the results of the tests (for equality of means (t-test) and equality of median (Mann-Whitney) see table 3, 4 
and table 6.  
49 But the results do not change qualitatively when treating the 33 bridge financed companies as non venture-
backed companies, thus enlarging the database to be analyzed.   14
the first day and 20 days after the IPO and information on the over-allotment option exercise 
(greenshoe).  
To clearly identify the VC-firms and private equity companies and their age, internet pages 
and company reports (if available), as well as the list of the full members of Bundesverband 
Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften  – German Venture Capital Association e.V. 
(BVK) and the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) were used. 
For the construction of the underwriter’s rating the information needed on lead management 
at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990 was provided by Deutsche Börse AG. 
 
A total of 86 different underwriters (48 different lead underwriters) have been involved in 
IPOs at Frankfurt stock exchange from March 1997 to March 2000.
50 Because of the changing 
or rather increasing issuing activity during that time period I construct a rating for each year
51. 
That is because the rating of an underwriter can change over time. The data of banks that 
merge during the investigation period (such as Bankhaus Gontard and Metallbank or 
Bayerische Vereinsbank and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank) are aggregated in 
order to avoid major changes in the rating. However, changes in rating are desired in case of a 
relative increase of the issuing activity or a relative increase of the underwritten volume of 
issues. The parent population is divided into five rating categories and condensed to a dummy 
in the regressions.
52 In detail, the ratings of the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 are constructed 
using equally the track record of each underwriter as gauged by the relative share of lead 
management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990
53 and the relative volume of 
launched issues at the Neuer Markt 
54 as reported on December 31
st of the precedent year. Due 
to the lack of a track record of the relative volume of launched issues at the Neuer Markt for 
                                                 
50  WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER (1994) stress the dominant role of Deutsche Bank in the underwriter market 
during the time period 1961 to 1987, since Deutsche Bank has functioned as lead manager for slightly less 
than half of the issues. This has changed during the time period 1990 to 2000. Although Deutsche Bank still 
belongs to the top issuers, their supremacy in underwriting has relatively been decreasing. 
51 Table A.2. presents the twelve best-rated underwriters serving as lead underwriter at Neuer Markt during the 
time period 1997 – 2000.  
52 The dummy has the value one in case the underwriter’s rating is very good; in any other case (1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3) 
the dummy is equivalent to zero. From 199 IPO companies under consideration, 108 have been underwritten 
by a prestigious lead underwriter rated very good. 
53 The relative share of lead management at all Frankfurt stock market segments for each year is calculated by 
cumulating the number of lead management for each bank since 1990 and dividing this number by the 
cumulated number of IPOs that took place since 1990. 
54 In order to calculate the relative volume of issues at the Neuer Markt for each bank I cumulate the volume of 
issues each bank has underwritten (as lead- or co-underwriter) since 1997 and divide it by the total volume of 
issues of all IPOs at the Neuer Markt since 1997.   15
the year 1997, the rating of 1997 is solely based on each bank’s relative share of lead 
management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990. 
However the (one) rating that represents the quality of the venture capitalists and private 
equity companies is mainly based on the age of the company. VC and private equity 
companies founded before 1980 receive a very good rating (equivalent to 1), companies 
founded before 1995 and after 1980 receive a mediate rating (equivalent to 2). Companies 
founded after 1995 get the lowest rating (equivalent to 3). For some companies it was 
impossible to find information regarding their age. In these cases the assumption of little 
prestige resulting in a low rating (equivalent to 3) seems to be reasonable. The motive for 
using first of all the age as proxy for reputation is that in general there is a lack of a past 
performance. This fact is reflected in a total of 112 venture funds/companies or private equity 
companies backing 91 IPO firms: 75 of these (66.96%) back only one IPO firm, 32 (28.57%) 
back between 2 and 5, and only 5 (4.46%) back more than 5, up to 10 IPOs during the time 
period March 1997 – March 2000. Thus only in two cases
55 a relative high backing activity 
during the period under consideration leads to an upgrade in rating. In analogy to the 
underwriters’ rating, the information concerning the quality of the lead venture capitalist is 
condensed to a dummy in the regressions.
56 
In line with LJUNGQVIST (1999), the venture capitalist with the biggest stake (which usually 
corresponds with the longest investment horizon within the portfolio company) is defined as 
the lead venture capitalist. 54 of the 112 venture funds/companies or private equity companies 
act as lead financier, whereas the remaining 58 merely engage themselves within a syndicate.
  
                                                 
55 These financial intermediaries have been Commerz Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG and Gold Zack AG. 
56 The dummy is equal to unity if the financier’s rating is very good (this is the case in about one third of the 58 
venture-backed IPOs or rather 33 IPOs backed by bridge financing); in any other case (2 or 3) the dummy is 
equivalent to zero. (Table A.3. in the appendix presents the eleven best rated venture capitalists during the 
time period March 1997 - March 2000).   16
 
6.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3: Issuer and Offering Characteristics and Costs of Venture-Backed respectively  
Bridge Financed Companies to Non Venture-Backed Companies Listed at the Neuer Markt. 
The data set consists of 108 non venture-backed IPOs (NVC), 58 venture-backed IPOs (VC) and 33 
companies (BF) that received bridge financing. The participation ratio (for instance of the manager) is 
calculated by dividing the number of old shares sold (by the manager) by the (manager’s) number of 
shares outstanding before flotation. Underpricing is measured as the spread between the initial 
offering price and the opening price at the first day of trading. NEMAX is the stock market index of the 
Neuer Markt at Frankfurt stock exchange. The test for differences in means is a standard  t-test, 
allowing for unequal variance. The test for differences in medians is the Mann-Whitney test. One, two 
and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
   Obs.  Mean  p-value  Median  p-value 
Employees  NVC 108        250          117   
   VC   58        220  0.5788        110  0.8669 
   BF   32        197  0.4514        115  0.3771 
Age of company  NVC 108          11     9   
   VC   58          10  0.3516   7  0.2208 
   BF   33          10  0.5449   9  0.6897 
Balance sheet total,   NVC 108   26,365      12,383   
 in thousand €  VC   58   31,339  0.5577    11,538  0.8695 
   BF   32   13,922   0.0545*      8,286    0.0652* 
EBIT in thousand €  NVC 108          26     9   
 per employee  VC   58           -6      0.0023***  -2   0.0002*** 
   BF   31            3       0.0771*   4  0.0427** 
Sales revenues   NVC 108        269          108   
 in thousand €  VC   58        135    0.0299**        106  0.3277 
 per employee  BF   31        171  0.2416        100  0.5900 
Growth rate   NVC 88    70.86       44.21   
 of sales revenues,   VC 47    86.96  0.5750     25.10  0.5134 
 in %  BF 26    80.39  0.7602     54.65  0.7535 
Total volume   NVC 108     1,962       1,451   
 of issues,  VC   58     2,519   0.0735*     1,870  0.0227** 
 in thousand  BF   33     1,939  0.9484     1,600  0.7222 
Old stocks sold in %  NVC 108    16.35       10.22   
 of total volume  VC   58    22.33   0.0547*     23.04   0.0637* 
 of issues  BF   33    19.99  0.3071     22.12  0.1601 
Participation old    NVC 108         0.0600            0.0357   
 stockholders  VC   58         0.1166        0.0002***          0.0829   0.0049*** 
   BF   33         0.0762  0.2446          0.0732    0.1474 
Participation   NVC 108         0.0681            0.0451   
 managers  VC   58         0.0559       0.4007          0.0000  0.0198** 
   BF   33         0.0333     0.0145**          0.0117   0.0044*** 
Underpricing in %  NVC 108    61.18       26.46   
   VC   58    64.63  0.8025     32.00  0.5902 
   BF   33    68.34  0.6690     38.86  0.2495 
20 day log return of   NVC 108     5.72        2.95   
 NEMAX before IPO  VC   57     6.37  0.7942       1.48  0.8545 
 in %  BF   33     4.86  0.7727      -0.18  0.4622   17
In terms of  issuer characteristics, venture-backed companies differ most from non-venture 
backed with regard to EBIT and sales revenues in thousand EURO per employee. Both ratios 
are on average significantly smaller: -6 versus 26 and 135 versus 269. Given no significant 
differences in the number of employees, in age, balance sheet total and in growth rates of 
sales revenues, there seems to be evidence that these otherwise comparable IPO companies 
are less profitable and less strong at selling when going public. This is remarkable.  
At the first glance the findings concerning offerings characteristics are in line with the results 
of LJUNGQVIST (1999). Venture-backed IPOs show a significantly higher volume of issues 
compared to non venture-backed IPOs. In particular venture-backed companies sell more old 
shares when going public. This is reflected by an average of 22.33% versus 16.35% of 
secondary sales of the total volume issued, and by an on average higher participation ratio of 
old stockholders (11.66% versus 6% of the shares outstanding before flotation). But – and that 
might have a reversal effect to venture-backers being more concerned with pricing  – the 
median participation ratio of managers in venture-backed IPOs is zero and thus lower. To 
keep an eye on that and to differentiate between different groups of former stockholders, such 
as venture capitalists, managers and underwriters owning shares of the issuing company 
before the IPO seems to be worthwhile when running the regressions.
57  
Furthermore, the univariate analysis shows that venture-backed companies do not seem to be 
less underpriced compared to non venture-backed (see table 3).  
 
Before turning to the empirical results I will briefly highlight some further characteristics of 
venture-backed companies that distinguish them from those which received bridge financing 
and justifies the three categories made: On average about 57% of the VC-backed companies 
have been financed by a syndicate before the IPO
58, whereas issuing companies that received 
bridge financing dealt with more than one bridge financier only in one out of three cases (not 
reported).  
Compared to the stake of the lead venture capitalist that of the lead bridge financier is on 
average significantly higher before (26.48% versus 11.97%) and also after the IPO (14.47% 
versus 6.61%)
 59. This fact is all the more true for the average stake of the syndicate of venture 
                                                 
57 These groups do overlap as venture capitalists sometimes belong to the management. 
58  On average a venture-backed company is financed by three, on maximum by nine different venture 
firms/funds. 
59 The numbers are much higher compared to those stated by BARRY/MUSCARELLA/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS (1990) 
or HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000).   18
capitalists compared to the stake of the group of bridge financiers (before the IPO 40.48% 
versus 13.63%; after the IPO 22.39% versus 7.87%). In addition this means, that both groups 
of financial intermediaries sell on average 25% of their pre-IPO stake at the IPO which seems 
to be much higher than in the United States.
60 
Table 4: Characteristics of Financial Intermediaries and Offering Characteristics of  
Venture-Backed and Bridge Financed IPO Companies at the Neuer Markt. 
The data set consists of 58 venture-backed IPOs (VC) and 33 companies (BF) that received bridge 
financing. The participation ratio (e.g., of the lead venture capitalist or bridge financier, respectively) is 
calculated by dividing the number of old shares sold (by the lead venture capitalist or bridge financier, 
respectively) by the (lead venture capitalist’s and bridge financier’s respectively) number of shares 
outstanding before flotation. The test for differences in means is a standard  t-test, that allows 
differences in variance. The test for differences in medians is the Mann-Whitney test. One, two and 
three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
   Obs.  Mean    p-value  Median    p-value 
Number of venture 
 capitalists or bridge 
 financiers forming a  VC 58    2.60    0.0007***    2.00    0.0030** 
 syndicate  BF 33    1.36        1.00     
Stake of lead venture 
 capitalist/ lead bridge 
 financier before IPO,  VC 57  26.48    0.0002***  20.00    0.0002*** 
 in %  BF 33  11.97      13.47     
Stake of venture capitalists/ 
 bridge financiers before   VC 58  40.48    0.0000***  36.40    0.0000*** 
 IPO, in %  BF 33  13.63      13.85     
Stake of lead venture 
 capitalist/ lead bridge 
 financier after IPO,  VC 57  14.47    0.0003***  11.44    0.0001*** 
 in %  BF 33    6.61        6.30     
Stake of venture capitalists/ 
 bridge financiers after IPO,   VC 58  22.39    0.0000***  21.30    0.0000*** 
 in %  BF 33    7.87        7.50     
Participation lead venture 
 capitalist/  VC 57       0.2246    0.4223       0.2034    0.7227 
 bridge financier  BF 32       0.2679           0.2404     
Seats on the “Aufsichtsrat” 
 held by venture capitalists  VC 58  25.37    0.0054***  33.33    0.0125** 
 or bridge financiers, in %  BF 33  14.09        0.00     
Duration of financial    VC 57       2.9649    0.0000***       2.0000    0.0000*** 
 relationship in years  BF 33       1.0303           1.0000     
Dummy rating of lead 
 venture capitalist/  VC 58       0.3448    0.8586       0.0000    0.8851 
 bridge financier = 1  BF 33       0.3636           0.0000     
Number of IPOs where 
 venture capitalists/ 
 bridge financiers do not  VC 58  27.27    0.4792    0.00    0.6059 
 sell, in %  BF 33  20.69        0.00     
                                                 
60 According to a study by BARRY/MUSCARELLA/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS  (1990) US  venture capitalists own on 
average 34.3% prior and 24.6% after the IPO, thus they sell on average only 6.6% of their pre-IPO shares.   19
Furthermore, venture capitalists are more likely to command over more inside information 
than bridge financiers, since the former hold an average of 25.37%
61 versus 14.09% of the 
seats on the “Aufsichtsrat”. Besides venture capitalists have engaged themselves much longer 
in the issuing company before the IPO, namely about two years longer on average.  
Taking the proportion of ownership and degree of insider knowledge into account the bridge 
financiers’ certification ability seems to be modest. Therefore the results presented in the 
following are dispensed with the bridge financed sub sample. 
 
 
7.  Empirical Results 
The determinants of underpricing are examined applying an ordinary least square regression 
analysis with underpricing as depended variable. 
 
In order to measure the ex-ante uncertainty concerning the value of an IPO company two 
different proxies are used: In line with e.g. RITTER (1984) and WASSERFALLEN/WITTLEDER 
(1994), for each IPO company the standard deviation of the log returns from day two to 
twenty (vola) are calculated, which I expect to reflect the degree of dispersed information or 
rather uncertainty. Theory predicts a positive relation between uncertainty and underpricing. 
Since this proxy might be distorted due to underwriter price support in the aftermarket (see 
LJUNGQVIST (1997)) the log of the number of employees (empl) is included, as well. Large 
companies that go public and employ many people should be less underpriced than small 
companies.
62 Following  LJUNGQVIST/JENKINSON (2000) and  LOUGHRAN/RITTER (1999), I 
calculate to what extend the book-building range (bookb) was exhausted. Issues priced at the 
maximum price limit, exhausting 100% of the book-building range, should be more 
underpriced compared to IPOs with an issue price that falls within the book-building range or 
below the minimum price limit. 
 
Besides I use the market trend, a proxy LÖFFLER (2000) and earlier UHLIR (1989) employed in 
their examination of underpricing. The market trend is estimated using the NEMAX
63 for the 
period twenty days before the IPO (nemax). As  LÖFFLER documents, there seem to exist 
                                                 
61 This number is lower as the one reported by BARRY/MUSCARELL/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS (1990).  
62 I also checked whether the age or the total volume of assets could serve as an explanatory variable for the 
amount of underpricing, but found no significant correlation. 
63 NEMAX is the stock market index of Neuer Markt at Frankfurt stock exchange. The introduction of this 
variable does not affect the other results found.   20
(psychological/market) factors that lead to a significant positive relation between the trend of 
the Nemax and the degree of underpricing.  
One can either apply a dummy for “backed by venture capital” or less condensed information, 
i.e., the percentage of the venture capitalists’ equity holdings prior to the IPO (VCholding). 
Since it should make a difference whether a venture capitalist holds for instance 5% or 50% 
of a company prior to IPO, (as explained in section 4, see hypothesis 3b) I will use the latter.  
 
With reference to the hypotheses discussed in section 4, this leads to the following predicted 
signs for the regressions:  
  ¶vola  ¶empl  ¶bookb  ¶nemax  ¶UWrank  ¶VCrank  ¶VCholding  ¶partratio  ¶dilution 
¶ UP  +  -  +  +  -  -  -  -  ? 
 
The results are presented in table 5, page 21. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of table 5 ignore the incentive argument of LJUNGQVIST (1999) and thus 
resemble earlier studies, for instance the analysis of MEGGINSON/WEISS (1991). All parameter 
estimates that represent the degree of ex-ante uncertainty (vola, bookb) or size (empl) show 
the predicted signs on a significant level. The smaller the issuing company and the higher the 
standard deviation of the log returns from day two to twenty, the higher the underpricing. 
Moreover, the more the book-building range was exhausted, the higher the underpricing. 
These results are in line with earlier studies on the German market, such as WASSERFALLEN/ 
WITTLEDER (1994). The highly significant coefficient for the market trend (nemax) supports 
the findings of LÖFFLER (2000): The initial return rises on average about between 2.2% and 
2.3% with each percentage point the log return of the Nemax is rising prior to the IPO.  
 
Concerning the certification role of venture capitalists and underwriters, I do not find any 
support either for hypotheses 2 or 3.  
On the contrary, companies that are backed by a prestigious venture capitalist experience 
greater underpricing: The coefficient VCrank=1 is positive and significant at the 10% or 5% 
level, respectively. Remarkably, there is no significant outcome when controlling for venture 
capitalists with a lower rating (not reported). However, the effect found seems to be obscured: 
When interacting the dummy f or the rating of prestigious venture capitalists with the   21
 
Table 5: Test of the Certification Hypotheses: Underpricing. 
 
The dependent variable is underpricing. The variable vola is equivalent to the standard deviation 
of the log returns from day two to twenty prior to the IPO, empl represents the log of the number 
of employees, bookb reflects the extend to which the book-building range was utilized, nemax
incorporates the market trend twenty days before the IPO. The variables  UWrank=1 and 
VCrank=1  are dummies for underwriters and venture capitalists rated very good. VCholding
presents the venture capitalist’s equity holding prior to the IPO, partratio and dilut are explained 
in footnotes 41 and 43, respectively. The variable  nosal_VC is a dummy equal to 1  if the 
syndicate of venture capitalists does not sell shares at the IPO and zero otherwise. The dummy 
conflict is equal to 1 if the venture capitalist is affiliated with one of the (lead-) underwriters. 
Throughout, the interference is based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In 
columns 5 and 6, the total effect of the presence of a prestigious venture capitalist is tested in 
an F-test. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Variables: 
 constant  0.574  0.569  0.544   0.624*  0.527  0.542 
0.1120  0.1161  0.1317  0.0939  0.1583  0.1519 
 vola   4.194*    4.469**    4.599**   4.262*   4.242*   4.303* 
0.0611  0.0462  0.0418  0.0579  0.0580  0.0550 
 empl  -0.112*  -0.108*  -0.109*  -0.115*  -0.119*  -0.121* 
0.0648  0.0760  0.0812  0.0639  0.0559  0.0533 
 bookb      0.293***    0.233**    0.219**    0.242**      0.327***     0.316*** 
0.0057  0.0380  0.0487  0.0285  0.0020  0.0028 
 nemax      2.302***     2.238***     2.241***     2.283***     2.309***     2.314*** 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 UWrank=1  -0.050  -0.033  -0.037  -0.039  0.009  0.010 
0.6655  0.7744  0.7500  0.7371  0.9383  0.9301 
 VCrank=1   0.406*    0.856**    0.869**    1.022**    0.842**    0.896** 
0.0781  0.0463  0.0443  0.0213  0.0384  0.0326 
 VCholding  -0.306  -0.125  -0.172  0.110  -0.174  -0.208 
0.2187  0.6579  0.5903  0.7482  0.6173  0.5490 
 partratio_Old      0.088       
    0.8860       
 dilution_Old      0.090       
    0.4362       
 partratio_VC        -0.331  0.087  0.126 
      0.2997  0.8113  0.7249 
 dilution_VC        -0.054  -0.079  -0.067 
      0.3246  0.1419  0.2289 
 nosal_VC              0.566***     0.626*** 
        0.0093  0.0034 
 conflict            -0.182 
            0.4345 
Interaction term:    -1.080  -1.089  -1.406*  -1.250*  -1.315* 
 VCrank=1  *  VCholding    0.1187  0.1178  0.0542  0.0681  0.0672 
Adj. R
2  30.53%  31.12%  30.30%  31.24%  32.97%  32.73% 
p-value (F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
F-test: VCrank          0.0852  0.0701 
Number of observations  164  164  164  164  164  164 
 
   22
percentage of the venture capitalist’s equity holdings prior to the IPO, the interaction term is 
negative.
64 
Now, the overall finding of venture-backed issues appearing, if anything, to be  more 
underpriced is in line with the results of  LJUNGQVIST (1999) for the 1990´s and those of 
FRANCIS/HASAN (2001) and SMART/ZUTTER (2000). Though it is in contrast with the results 
of  LIN/SMITH (1998) or  BARRY/MUSCARELLA/PEAVY/VETSUYPENS (1990). The latter 
empirical studies show that the higher the venture capitalist’s reputation (measured for 
example by the venture capitalist’s age and the former backing activity), the lower the 
underpricing. I have re-estimated the regression using other factors that usually serve as 
proxies for the monitoring or backing-quality of venture capitalists, such  as the natural 
logarithm of the age of the lead venture capitalist at IPO, the number of seats on the 
“Aufsichtsrat” held (in percent) and the age of the financial relationship. Unfortunately I did 
not get any further insights. Since the venture capitalists’ rating is based on the age of the lead 
venture capitalists, it is not astonishing that this coefficient behaves equivalent to the dummy 
for the VC-rating: it is positive and significant. Concerning the other two coefficients, they 
are not statistically significant.  
 
With regard to the marginal effect of underwriter reputation I have to observe a general lack 
of significance of the coefficients. This suggests that companies, that have hired a prestigious 
lead underwriter when floating stocks are not better off than others. This result corresponds to 
earlier findings of KASERER/KEMPF (1995) for the German market. As expected, I obtain the 
same result when adding a term to the regression that interacts the rating of the underwriter 
with that of the venture capitalist (not reported).  
 
Following LJUNGQVIST (1999) and  BARRY  (1989) I have introduced the participation ratio 
(serving as proxy for the selling intensity at IPO) and the dilution factor of the former 
shareholders in column (3) and subsequent columns of table 5. Since the data have been 
available I could control for the incentives of the group of the former shareholders as a whole, 
for the managers (not reported) and venture capitalists separately.  
But due to the lack of significance - irrespectively of the identity of the group controlled for - 
I am not able to confirm the results found by LJUNGQVIST (1999). There is no evidence for 
                                                 
64 Though this term is only significant when controlling for the venture capitalists incentives to take influence on 
underpricing (see table 5, column (4)).   23
underpricing to be lower due to incentives of former owners with a high selling intensity at 
the IPO.  
In summary, no certification effect at the IPO could be found for venture capitalists or 
underwriters. Furthermore, there is no evidence that former stockholders selling shares at the 
IPO are particularly concerned about wealth loss and thus take influence on the pricing of an 
issue. Only hypothesis (1), which offers ex-ante uncertainty as a factor that determines 
underpricing finds considerable support. 
 
 
Extensions 
The question is why issues backed by prestigious venture capitalists appear to be  more 
underpriced. 
It seems to be puzzling, but similar results have been found before. FRANCIS/HASAN (2001) 
analyze a data set of companies going public in the United States during the period 1990 – 
1993 using a stochastic frontier model. They show that VC-backed IPOs suffer higher 
underpricing due to greater pre-market pricing inefficiencies, which are to a significant part 
deliberate and should compensate investors for information production. The study by 
SMART/ZUTTER (2000) examines dual- and single-class IPOs and indicates underpricing to be 
more pronounced among VC-backed companies, too. They attribute this result to the 
circumstance that an increasing number of IPO companies has been financed by younger VC 
companies, that possibly engage in “grandstanding”
65 by taking their companies earlier to the 
market and at a larger discount than do established VCs. 
LJUNGQVIST (1999), who analyzes a 1990s data set of IPOs, finds evidence that top 
underwriters are associated with significant increases in underpricing. An effect, which is in 
particular concentrated amongst venture-backed IPOs. But why do venture capitalists choose 
to work with prestigious investment banks whose pricing is so much worse? LJUNGQVIST 
offers an explanation: There are situations, that are characterized by a conflict of interest 
between entrepreneur and venture capitalist. He considers the case, that the entrepreneur sells 
some shares at the IPO but the lead venture capitalist none. In such situation the venture 
capitalist is not concerned about engaging a prestigious underwriter who underprices more 
than the average, since the incurring wealth losses have to be borne primarily by the selling 
owner rather than by himself.  
                                                 
65 For an intense study on the phenomenon “grandstanding”, see GOMPERS (1996).   24
In my sample, in particular IPOs backed by prestigious or rather older venture capitalists are 
considerably more underpriced than IPOs that belong to any other segment. On average they 
are underpriced by 91.07% compared to 50.71% when backed by a less prestigious, younger 
venture capitalist or 61.18% when non venture-backed. It is surprising as these companies 
seem to be relatively large with respect to balance sheet totals and employees. Moreover this 
result contradicts the idea of “grandstanding” and thus the explanation offered by 
SMART/ZUTTER (2000). It thus seems to be rather interesting to analyze, whether the 
significant differences in underpricing can be explained by a non-selling behavior of venture 
capitalists, too.  
Table 6: Characteristics of IPOs Backed by Prestigious Venture Capitalists (PVC)  
and Those With Lower Reputation (NPVC) at the Neuer Markt 
      Obs.  Mean  p-value  Median  p-value 
Underpricing in %    PVC  20        91.07  0.0632*        46.55  0.1547 
   NPVC  38        50.71          25.98   
No sale     PVC  20        30.00  0.3234          0.00  0.4767 
 venture capitalists  NPVC  38        18.42            0.00   
Employees    PVC  20  347  0.0076***  193  0.0355** 
   NPVC  38  152      97   
Balance sheet total,    PVC  20     36,521  0.7017     23,547  0.0012*** 
 in thousand €  NPVC  38     28,612         9,273   
 
The descriptive statistic shows that 30% of the prestigious and still about 18.4% of the lowest 
rated venture capitalists do not sell at IPO. These are 13 out of 58 VC-backed cases in total. In 
column (5) of table 5 I re-estimated the previous regression including a dummy for venture 
capitalists not selling at the IPO ( nosal_VC). Indeed, the impact of such a non-selling 
behavior of venture capitalists is in any case (regardless of the rating) a significant increase in 
underpricing. This result is robust but does not solve the original puzzle, since the coefficient 
for the dummy of IPOs backed by prestigious venture capitalists remains significant and 
positive, though smaller.  
 
A further explanation why VC-backed IPOs are  more underpriced is offered by 
HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000). These authors examine IPOs in Japan. In Japan, venture   25
capital funds are often affiliated with major financial institutions. This circumstance can lead 
to potential conflicts of interest, since the underwriting bank, if an owner of the issuing 
company, is interested in setting a higher offer price than it would if it was merely acting as a 
financial intermediary. Furthermore, these banks have increased incentives to overstate the 
company  value to investors. Given that IPO investors do anticipate this conflict of interest, 
they will, according to theory, demand more underpricing as compensation. In line with this, 
HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER find higher initial returns for IPOs in which the lead venture 
capitalist is also the lead underwriter.
66 Although affiliations between venture capitalists and 
underwriting banks exist in Germany, too,
67 they are not as common as in Japan. I have tried 
to control for this phenomenon of affiliation for the German m arket, though I have only 
eleven observations in my data set. However, the result lacks of significance and thus does not 
support this explanatory approach (see table 5, column 6).  
Even though I could demonstrate that the non-selling behavior of venture capitalists drives 
underpricing, the appearance of IPOs backed by prestigious venture capitalists being more 
underpriced deserves further examinations.  
 
Finally I would like to conclude with an illustration of the relative effect of underpricing on 
the venture capitalist’s return on investment when selling at IPO:  
A major German venture capitalist provided data on the historical costs of the shares of four 
IPO companies in my data set. I calculated the approximate return
68 from investment until 
IPO, using the offering price (OP) and the closing price (CP) on the first trading day.
69  
 
Table 7: Returns on Four Investments of one Major German Venture Capitalist 
 
A  B  C  D 
Return OP  258%  132%  200%  519% 
Return CP  294%  182%  530%  506% 
 
                                                 
66  Apart from this special case mentioned, HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000) find that VC-backed IPOs exhibit a 
significant reduction in underpricing relative to other issues. 
67  E xamples are Deutsche Venture Capital Gesellschaft and Deutsche Bank, Beteiligungsgesellschaft für die 
Deutsche Wirtschaft and Dresdner Bank AG, TFG Venture Capital and Concord Effekten AG or Commerz 
Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG and Commerzbank AG. 
68  As no information regarding the exact date of the initial investment is available, I am not able to calculate a 
time-adjusted return. 
69  In cases A, B and C, the offering price was fixed at the maximum price limit. In case D, which was 
overpriced, the offering price was fixed at the lower bound of the book-building range.   26
As easily can be seen, each of these investments was a success story for the venture capitalist, 
which partially was realized through selling at IPO.
70 But at least in the first three cases the 
good result was accompanied by the knowledge, that the return on investment could have 
been better, if there had been no underpricing.  
Given, for the period under consideration the four companies above are a good example for an 
IPO portfolio of a venture capitalist in Germany, I would like to formulate some hypotheses, 
that could serve as further explanations for the findings of my empirical study and should 
therefore be tested in future: 
Venture capitalists seem not to care particularly about underpricing, as the bad news of money 
left on the table comes as part of a package that includes the good news of a successful partial 
exit.
71 Moreover venture capitalists seem to be more concerned about the long-run 
performance and the timing of the further exit, since they retain on average three-quarters of 
their shares beyond the IPO-date.
72  
 
 
8.  Summary and Outlook 
The main contribution of this empirical study is to shed further light on the growing 
importance of venture capital in Germany after the introduction of the Neuer Markt at the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In particular the role of venture capitalists and underwriters in 
certifying the quality of a company when going public is examined.  
Papers by CARTER/MANASTER (1990) and BOTH/SMITH (1986) argue, that the spread between 
the initial offering price and the opening price on the first day of trading (underpricing) should 
be lower for venture-backed IPOs compared to non venture-backed IPOs due to a reduced ex-
ante uncertainty concerning the value of the issuing company.  
However, to focus only on underpricing might  be  misleading.  According to  LJUNGQVIST 
(1999) the behavior of old shareholders at the IPO is essential. The more they participate in 
the offering, that is the more shares they are selling at the IPO, the more they have incentives 
to take influence leading to a reduced underpricing.   
 
                                                 
70 As mentioned, on average venture capitalists sell 25% of their pre-IPO stake. Dividing the group into venture 
capitalists that sell and those that do not sell, the venture capitalists who sell shares at the IPO, sell on average 
about 32%. Only in one case the venture capitalist sold 100%. 
71  A similar argumentation based on the prospect theory can be found by LOUGHRAN/RITTER (1999). 
72  For empirical studies on the U.S. market see for instance BRAV/G OMPERS (1997)   27
When running the regressions to test the hypotheses that venture-backed IPOs are less 
underpriced compared to non venture-backed IPOs, I control for ex-ante uncertainty, for the 
market trend, for the venture-capitalists’ share of the company prior to the IPO, and, taking 
Ljungqvist’s argument into account, for the incentives of old shareholders to reduce 
underpricing. 
 
Turning to the results of this study, the huge number of financial intermediaries engaged in 
IPOs at Neuer Markt is worth mentioning: 86 underwriters and 112 venture capitalists or 
rather private equity companies.  
Concerning the companies that went public at the Neuer Markt, I found that VC-backed 
companies are less profitable and have lower sales revenue-ratios compared to non venture-
backed companies. Though, they are similar with respect to number of employees, age, 
balance sheet total, growth rates of sales revenues or the amount of underpricing. Venture-
backed firms issue significantly more shares compared to non venture-backed ones. However, 
this difference might be attributed to the circumstance that VC-backed companies sell more 
old shares when going public. The fact that the group of venture capitalists sells an average 
25% of their pre-IPO stake at the IPO supports this assumption. 
More than half of the VC-backed companies have been financed by a syndicate of venture 
capitalists. They seem to have considerable influence, since they hold on average a stake of 
40% of the company before the IPO and about 25% of the seats on the “Aufsichtsrat”. 
 
With reference to the results of the regressions, there is strong evidence that the higher the ex-
ante uncertainty about  the value of a company going public the higher the underpricing. 
Furthermore, the market trend has a non-negligible positive impact on the amount of 
underpricing. However, the use of this variable does not affect the other results found.  
With regard to the certification role of underwriters and/or venture capitalists, I am unable to 
provide evidence. It does not seem to pay to hire a prestigious intermediary, at least as far as 
underpricing is concerned. On the contrary: The involvement of a prestigious venture 
capitalist leads to a higher underpricing. This finding holds, irrespective of whether I control 
for venture capitalist not selling at the IPO (following the argumentation of LJUNGQVIST 
(1999)) or for conflicts of interest due to an affiliation of the venture capitalist and the 
underwriting bank (in line with HAMAO/PACKER/RITTER (2000)). The finding that prestigious 
venture capitalists appear to lead to more underpricing, warrants further research.  
   28
When interpreting theses results one has to keep in mind that the data set under consideration 
was collected in a period, that can be characterized as a bull market. With the end of the 
examined period, i.e., since March 2000, there has been a sharp depression at the Neuer Markt 
along with a relative decline in IPOs. It would be worthwhile to enlarge the sample to check 
whether in bear markets a value of certification either through underwriters or venture 
capitalists exists. Moreover, this would allow to study the effect of an affiliation between 
underwriter and venture capitalist based on more observations. 
 
In addition, since venture capitalists only sell on average about 25% of their shares at the IPO, 
an examination of their further exit strategy would be of utmost interest. Not least as the 
(timing of the) exit seems to be decisive for the venture capitalist’s return on investment and 
thus the building up of further reputation.  
Moreover, an extensive study of the direct costs that arise when going public at Neuer Markt 
seems to be worthwhile. Since on average companies going public at Neuer Markt have to 
bear direct costs of 8.43% of the gross proceeds, it would be interesting to know in how far 
these costs are of discretionary nature (e.g. costs derived from pre-IPO marketing activities) 
and thus could be used in order to reduce underpricing.   29
Appendix Figures: 
Figure A.1: Business Foundations in Western Germany; since 1990 in the Old West and  
Newly-Formed German States (in Numbers of Newly Established Businesses)
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Figure A.2: Development of Gross Investments of Members of the BVK (in € Mio.)  
and Number of Beneficiary Companies  
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73  These numbers are estimations of the INSTITUT FÜR MITTELSTANDSFORSCHUNG (IFM).   30
Appendix Tables:  
Table A.1: Data Set Neuer Markt - March 10, 1997 - March 10, 2000 
Year 
Number of 
Venture-
Backed IPOs  VC in % 
Number IPOs 
Backed by 
Bridge 
Financing  BF in % 
Number of 
Non Venture-
Backed IPOs  NVC in %  Total 
1997 6  54.55% 1  9.09% 4  36.36% 11 
1998 9  21.95% 9  21.95% 23  56.10% 41 
1999 37  29.37% 19  15.08% 70  55.56% 126 
2000 6  28.57% 4  19.05% 11  52.38% 21 
Total 58  29.15% 33  16.58% 108  54.27% 199 
 
Table A.2: The Twelve Best Rated Underwriters Serving as Lead Underwriter  
at the Neuer Markt During the Time Period 1997 - 2000 
The u nderwriter rating of the year 1997 is based on the relative share of lead management at all 
Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990; ratings of the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 are using 
equally weighted the track record of each underwriter concerning the relative share of lead 
management at all Frankfurt stock market segments since 1990 and the relative volume of launched 
issues at the Neuer Markt since 1997. A top rating is equivalent to one, the lowest rating equals the 
value of 3. 
Underwriter 
 
Rating 
1997 
Rating 
1998 
Rating 
1999 
Rating 
2000 
Commerzbank AG  1  1  1  1 
Deutsche Bank AG  1  1  1  1 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 
(Bayerische Hypotheken- u. Wechselbank / 
Bayerische Vereinsbank) 
1  1.5  1  1 
BHF-Bank AG  1  1.5  1  1 
DG BANK AG  2  1  1  1 
Dresdner Bank AG  2  1  1  1 
West LB Girozentrale  2  1  1  1 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. OHG  2  2  1  1 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG  1  2  1.5  1.5 
Gontard & MetallBank AG (Heinrich Gontard & 
Co. OHG / Metallbank GmbH) 
3  2  1.5  1 
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KgaA  3  2.5  1.5  1 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KgaA  2  2  2  1   31
Table A.3: The Eleven Best Rated Venture Capitalists / Private Equity Companies  
Backing Companies that Went Public  
at Neuer Markt During the Period March 1997 - March 2000 
The rating representing the quality of the venture capitalists and private equity companies is mainly 
based on the age of the company. Venture capitalists and private equity companies founded before 
1980 received a very good rating (equal to 1), companies founded before 1995 and after 1980 received 
a mediate rating (equivalent to 2). Companies founded after 1995 got the lowest rating (equivalent to 
3). Thus only in two cases (Commerz Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG and Gold Zack) an relative high 
backing activity during the time period under consideration leads to an upgrade in rating. 
VC / private equity companies  Founded in   Number of 
backed IPO 
companies  
Rating 
3i Group Plc. /3i Deutschland  1945  10  1 
Apax Partners & Co. Beteiligungsberatung AG  1969  5  1 
Atlas Venture Germany  1980  4  1 
BdW Beteiligungsgesellschaft für die deutsche 
Wirtschaft mbH & Co. KG 
1969  2  1 
Deutsche Beteiligungs(gesellschaft) AG   1965  2  1 
General Atlantic Partners   1980  1  1 
Goldman Sachs Group, L.P.   1950  1  1 
Gold-Zack AG  1990  10  1 
Commerz Unternehmensbeteiligungs AG  1987  6  1 
Schroders Ltd.   1957  3  1 
WestKB  
Westdeutsche Kapitalbeteiligungs mbH  
1969  1  1 
 
   32
Appendix  
Model of BARRY (1989), extended by HABIB and LJUNGQVIST(1998): 
 
Consider a company that has (S0) shares outstanding prior to going public and that issues (SN) 
new shares at the IPO. In such a case the former shareholders suffer a wealth loss due to 
underpricing and dilution. The amount of wealth loss is inter alia dependent on the 
participation ratio and the dilution factor. 
The participation ratio (partratio) is the ratio of the number of old shares sold (S0,S) to the 
number of shares outstanding before the flotation (S0). The dilution factor (dilution) is the 
ratio of new shares (SN) to the number of shares outstanding before the flotation (S0).  
partratio ” 
0
, 0
S
S S         dilution ” 
0 S
S N  
 
Let (P0) be the initial offer price, and let (P1) be the opening price at the first day of trading. 
In an efficient-market, this opening price at the first day of trading should reflect the 
(unobservable) value of the company prior to the IPO (S0 P*) plus the value of the money 
raised through flotation (ignoring the commission and other direct costs of going public): 
 
    P1 = 
) (
) * (
0
0 0
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     by transformation this is equivalent to  
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The smaller the offering in relation to the number of shares previously outstanding, the 
smaller the dilution effect. Thus the aggregated wealth loss of the former stockholders per old 
share (awl) is equivalent to: 
 
awl ” [S0,S (P* - P0)  +  (S0 – S0,S)  (P* - P1)] : S0 
  ”  4 4 3 4 4 2 1
ion participat
P P part ) * ( 0 -   +  
0
, 0 0 ) (
S
S S S -
  (P* - P1) 
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Given that the offering is underpriced, that is P* > P1 > P0, old shareholders suffer the greatest 
aggregate wealth loss when selling all of their shares in the IPO. In summary, former owners 
“will be more concerned with underpricing as the size of the issue grows (relative to their own 
holdings) or as they participate more by offering more of their own shares” (BARRY (1989),  
p. 1102). 
 
The extension of this model takes the possibility of costly actions into consideration, namely 
actions that influence the offer prices and thus reduce underpricing and wealth losses. Such 
costs (exp) could for example arise in connection with extensive marketing efforts prior to the 
IPO. These costs have to be add to the aggregated wealth loss arising from underpricing and 
dilution. Former shareholders therefore are assumed to minimize these so called total wealth 
losses per old share (twl): 
 
twl  ”  awl + exp 
 
“There is a trade-off between spending more (higher exp) and tolerating higher underpricing. 
At the optimum, the marginal effect of increasing exp to reduce underpricing should equal the 
marginal costs of doing so, implying that total wealth losses are invariant, at optimum, to 
exp.” (see LJUNGQVIST (1999), p. 6).    34
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